

QA: Analysis Tools

17-313 Fall 2023

Foundations of Software Engineering

<https://cmu-313.github.io>

Andrew Begel and Rohan Padhye

Learning Goals

- Gain an understanding of the relative strengths and weaknesses of static and dynamic analysis
- Examine several popular analysis tools and understand their use cases
- Understand how analysis tools are used in large open-source software

Administrivia

- Project P3 released Deployments, Analysis tools, Design Docs, Feature Reviews
 - Checkpoint due Oct 26th, Full Due Nov 2nd
 - Will need your cloud accounts (GCP/Render)
- Reminder: Submit participation activities on Gradescope only if you are attending in person. Cheating will result in AIVs.
 - New: Record the name of person(s) sitting besides you with activity
- Guest Lecture next week (Oct 31) by Torgeir Dingsøy on Agile Team Effectiveness
 - Required pre-class reading posted on website

Activity: Analyze the Python program statically (Yes/No/Maybe)

```
def n2s(n: int, b: int):  
    if n <= 0: return '0'  
    r = ""  
    while n > 0:  
        u = n % b  
        if u >= 10:  
            u = chr(ord('A') + u - 10)  
        n = n // b  
        r = str(u) + r  
    return r
```

1. What are the set of data types taken by variable `u` at any point in the program?
2. Can the variable `u` be a negative number?
3. Will this function always return a value?
4. Can there ever be a division by zero?
5. Will the returned value ever contain a minus sign '-'?

What static analysis can and cannot do

- Type-checking is well established
 - Set of data types taken by variables at any point
 - Can be used to prevent type errors (e.g. Java) or warn about potential type errors (e.g. Python)
- Checking for problematic patterns in syntax is easy and fast
 - Is there a comparison of two Java strings using `==`?
 - Is there an array access `a[i]` without an enclosing bounds check for `i`?
- Reasoning about termination is impossible in general
 - Halting problem
- Reasoning about exact values is hard, but conservative analysis via abstraction is possible
 - Is the bounds check before `a[i]` guaranteeing that `i` is within bounds?
 - Can the divisor ever take on a zero value?
 - Could the result of a function call be `42`?
 - Will this multi-threaded program give me a deterministic result?
 - Be prepared for "MAYBE"
- Verifying some advanced properties is possible but expensive
 - CI-based static analysis usually over-approximates conservatively

The Bad News: Rice's Theorem

Every static analysis is necessarily incomplete, unsound, undecidable, or a combination thereof

"Any nontrivial property about the language recognized by a Turing machine is undecidable."

Henry Gordon Rice, 1953

Static Analysis is well suited to detecting certain defects

- Security: Buffer overruns, improperly validated input...
- Memory safety: Null dereference, uninitialized data...
- Resource leaks: Memory, OS resources...
- API Protocols: Device drivers; real time libraries; GUI frameworks
- Exceptions: Arithmetic/library/user-defined
- Encapsulation:
 - Accessing internal data, calling private functions...
- Data races:
 - Two threads access the same data without synchronization

Static Analysis: Broad classification

- Linters
 - Shallow syntax analysis for enforcing code styles and formatting
- Pattern-based bug detectors
 - Simple syntax or API-based rules for identifying common programming mistakes
- Type-annotation validators
 - Check conformance to user-defined types
 - Types can be complex (e.g., “Nullable”)
- Data-flow analysis / Abstract interpretation)
 - Deep program analysis to find complex error conditions (e.g., “can array index be out of bounds?”)

Static analysis can be applied to all attributes

- Find bugs
- Refactor code
- Keep your code stylish!
- Identify code smells
- Measure quality
- Find usability and accessibility issues
- Identify bottlenecks and improve performance

Activity: Analyze the Python program dynamically

```
def n2s(n: int, b: int):  
    if n <= 0: return '0'  
    r = ""  
    while n > 0:  
        u = n % b  
        if u >= 10:  
            u = chr(ord('A') + u-10)  
        n = n // b  
        r = str(u) + r  
    return r  
  
print(n2s(12, 10))
```

1. What are the set of data types taken by variable `u` at any point in the program?
2. Did the variable `u` ever contain a negative number?
3. For how many iterations did the while loop execute?
4. Was there ever be a division by zero?
5. Did the returned value ever contain a minus sign '-'?

Dynamic analysis reasons about program executions


- Tells you properties of the program that were definitely observed
 - Code coverage
 - Performance profiling
 - Type profiling
 - Testing
- In practice, implemented by program instrumentation
 - Think “Automated logging”
 - Slows down execution speed by a small amount

Static Analysis vs Dynamic Analysis


- Requires only source code
 - Conservatively reasons about all possible inputs and program paths
 - Reported warnings may contain false positives
 - Can report all warnings of a particular class of problems
 - Advanced techniques like verification can prove certain complex properties, but rarely run in CI due to cost
- Requires successful build + test inputs
 - Observes individual executions
 - Reported problems are real, as observed by a witness input
 - Can only report problems that are seen. Highly dependent on test inputs. Subject to false negatives
 - Advanced techniques like symbolic execution can prove certain complex properties, but rarely run in CI due to cost

Static Analysis

Tools for Static Analysis



Static analysis is a key part of continuous integration



Travis CI



GitHub Actions





Static analysis used to be an academic amusement; now it's heavily commercialized

GitHub acquires code analysis tool Semmle

Frederic Lardinois @frederic / 1:30 pm EDT • September 18, 2019

Comment



Marketplace Search results

Types

Apps

Actions

Categories

API management

Chat

Code quality

Code review

Continuous integration

Deployment management

Deployment

IDEs

Learning

Localization

Mobile

Monitoring

Project management

Publishing

Search for apps and actions

Apps

Build on your workflow with apps that integrate with GitHub.

306 results filtered by Apps

- Zube** Agile project management that lets the entire team work with developers on GitHub
- WhiteSource Bolt** Detect open source vulnerabilities in real time with suggested fixes for quick remediation
- Crowdin** Agile localization for your projects
- Slack + GitHub** Connect your code without leaving Slack
- BackHub** Reliable GitHub repository backup, set up in minutes
- GitLocalize** Continuous Localization for GitHub projects
- Codacy** Automated code reviews to help developers ship better software, faster
- Code Climate** Automated code review for technical debt and test coverage
- Semaphore** Test and deploy at the push of a button
- Flapstastic** Manage flaky unit tests. Click a checkbox to instantly disable any test on all branches. Works with your current test suite
- DeepScan** Advanced static analysis for automatically finding runtime errors in JavaScript code
- Deplu** Automated dependency updates done right



News

Snyk Secures \$150M, Snags \$1B Valuation



Sydney Sawaya | Associate Editor

January 21, 2020 1:12 PM

Share this article:



Snyk, a developer-focused security startup that identifies vulnerabilities in open source applications, announced a \$150 million Series C funding round today. This brings the company's total investment to \$250 million alongside reports that put the company's valuation at more than \$1 billion.



Static analysis is also integrated into IDEs



```
cppcoreguidelines.cpp x
1 // To enable only C++ Core Guidelines checks
2 // go to Settings/Preferences | Editor | Inspections | C/C++ | Clang-Tidy
3 // and provide: -*,cppcoreguidelines-* in options
4
5 void fill_pointer(int* arr, const int num) {
6     for(int i = 0; i < num; ++i) {
7         arr[i] = 0;
8     }
9     Do not use pointer arithmetic
10
11 void fill_array(int ind) {
12     int arr[3] = {1,2,3};
13     arr[ind] = 0;
14 }
15
16 void cast_away_const(const int& magic_num)
17 {
18     const_cast<int&>(magic_num) = 42;
19 }
20
```

```
97 new Todo({
98     content: item,
99     updated_at: Date.now(),
100 })}.save(function (err, todo, count) {
101     if (err) return next(err);
102
103     /*
104     res.setHeader('Data', todo.content.toString('base64'));
105     res.redirect('/');
106     */
107
108     res.setHeader('Location', '/');
109     res.status(302).send(todo.content.toString('base64'));
110
111     // res.redirect('/#' + todo.content.toString('base64'));
112 });
113
114 };
```

H Cross-site Scripting (XSS)
Vulnerability CWE-79
Unsanitized input from the HTTP request body flows into send, where it is used to render an HTML page returned to the user. This may Scripting attack (XSS).


Data Flow - 12 steps

```
1 index.js:80 | var item = req.body.content;
2 index.js:80 | if (/-----+ = 'string' && item.match(ingRegex)) {
3 index.js:9 | Click to show in the Editor );
4 index.js:55 | function parse(todo) {
5 index.js:56 | var t = todo;
6 index.js:59 | var remainder = t.toString().indexOf(remainderToken);
7 index.js:61 | var time = t.slice(remainder + remainderToken.length);
8 index.js:69 | t = t.slice(0, remainder);
9 index.js:74 | return t;
```

What makes a good static analysis tool?

- Static analysis should be fast
 - Don't hold up development velocity
 - This becomes more important as code scales
- Static analysis should report few false positives
 - Otherwise developers will start to ignore warnings and alerts, and quality will decline
- Static analysis should be continuous
 - Should be part of your continuous integration pipeline
 - Diff-based analysis is even better -- don't analyse the entire codebase; just the changes
- Static analysis should be informative
 - Messages that help the developer to quickly locate and address the issue
 - Ideally, it should suggest or automatically apply fixes

(1) Linters: *Cheap, fast, and lightweight static source analysis*



Use linters to enforce style guidelines

Don't rely on manual inspection during code review!



RuboCop




Linters use very “shallow” static analysis to enforce formatting rules

- Ensure proper indentation
- Naming convention
- Line sizes
- Class nesting
- Documenting public functions
- Parenthesis around expressions
- What else?

Use linters to improve maintainability

- Why? We spend more time reading code than writing it.
 - Various estimates of the exact %, some as high as 80%
- Code ownership is usually shared
- The original owner of some code may move on
- Code conventions make it easier for other developers to quickly understand your code

Use Style Guidelines to facilitate communication



Guidelines are inherently opinionated, but **consistency** is the important point. Agree to a set of conventions and stick to them.

<https://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/> | <https://google.github.io/styleguide/> | <https://www.python.org/dev/peps/pep-0008>

Take Home Message: Style is an easy way to improve readability

- Everyone has their own opinion (e.g., tabs vs. spaces)
- Agree to a convention and stick to it
 - Use continuous integration to enforce it
- Use automated tools to fix issues in existing code

(2) Pattern-based Static Analysis Tools




- Bad Practice
- Correctness
- Performance
- Internationalization
- Malicious Code
- Multithreaded Correctness
- Security
- Dodgy Code

The screenshot shows the "FindBugs Bug Descriptions" page. It includes a sidebar with navigation links like "Docs and Info", "Downloads", and "Development". The main content area has a "Summary" section and a table of bug patterns.

Description	Category
RC: Equals method should not assume anything about the type of its argument	Bad practice
BIT: Check for sign of bitwise operation	Bad practice
CN: Class implements Cloneable but does not define or use clone method	Bad practice
CN: clone method does not call super.clone()	Bad practice
CN: Class defines clone() but doesn't implement Cloneable	Bad practice
CNT: Rough value of known constant found	Bad practice
Co: Abstract class defines covariant compareTo() method	Bad practice
Co: compareTo()/compare() incorrectly handles float or double value	Bad practice
Co: compareTo()/compare() returns Integer.MIN_VALUE	Bad practice
Co: Covariant compareTo() method defined	Bad practice
DE: Method might drop exception	Bad practice
DE: Method might ignore exception	Bad practice
DMI: Adding elements of an entry set may fail due to reuse of Entry objects	Bad practice
DMI: Random object created and used only once	Bad practice
DMI: Don't use removeAll to clear a collection	Bad practice
Dm: Method invokes System.exit(...)	Bad practice
Dm: Method invokes dangerous method runFinalizersOnExit	Bad practice
ES: Comparison of String parameter using == or !=	Bad practice
ES: Comparison of String objects using == or !=	Bad practice
Eq: Abstract class defines covariant equals() method	Bad practice
Eq: Equals checks for incompatible operand	Bad practice
Eq: Class defines compareTo(...) and uses Object.equals()	Bad practice
Eq: equals method fails for subtypes	Bad practice
Eq: Covariant equals() method defined	Bad practice
FI: Empty finalizer should be deleted	Bad practice
FI: Explicit invocation of finalizer	Bad practice
FI: Finalizer nulls fields	Bad practice
FI: Finalizer only nulls fields	Bad practice
FI: Finalizer does not call superclass finalizer	Bad practice
FI: Finalizer nullifies superclass finalizer	Bad practice
FI: Finalizer does nothing but call superclass finalizer	Bad practice
FS: Format string should use %n rather than \n	Bad practice
GC: Unchecked type in generic call	Bad practice
HE: Class defines equals() but not hashCode()	Bad practice
HE: Class defines equals() and uses Object.hashCode()	Bad practice
HE: Class defines hashCode() but not equals()	Bad practice
HE: Class defines hashCode() and uses Object.equals()	Bad practice
HE: Class inherits equals() and uses Object.hashCode()	Bad practice
IC: Superclass uses subclass during initialization	Bad practice
IMSE: Dubious catching of IllegalStateException	Bad practice
ISC: Needless instantiation of class that only supplies static methods	Bad practice
I: Iterator next() method can't throw NoSuchElementException	Bad practice
JZEE: Store of non serializable object into HttpSession	Bad practice
JCIP: Fields of immutable classes should be final	Bad practice
ME: Public enum method unconditionally sets its field	Bad practice

SpotBugs can be extended with plugins



The screenshot shows the Find Security Bugs project website. The page features a navigation bar, a main heading 'Find Security Bugs', a description of the SpotBugs plugin, and sections for 'Features', 'Screenshots', and 'References'. The 'Features' section lists capabilities like 138 bug patterns, support for frameworks, and OWASP TOP 10 coverage. The 'Screenshots' section shows the plugin's integration with Eclipse, IntelliJ / Android Studio, and Sonar Qube.

Bad Practice:

```
String x = new String("Foo");  
String y = new String("Foo");  
  
if (x == y) {  
    System.out.println("x and y are the same!");  
} else {  
    System.out.println("x and y are different!");  
}
```

Bad Practice: ES_COMPARING_STRINGS_WITH_EQ

Comparing strings with ==

```
String x = new String("Foo");  
String y = new String("Foo");
```

```
if (x == y) {  
if (x.equals(y)) {  
    System.out.println("x and y are the same!");  
} else {  
    System.out.println("x and y are different!");  
}
```

Performance:

```
public static String repeat(String string, int times)
{
    String output = string;
    for (int i = 1; i < times; ++i) {
        output = output + string;
    }
    return output;
}
```

Performance: SBSC_USE_STRINGBUFFER_CONCATENATION

Method concatenates strings using + in a loop

```
public static String repeat(String string, int times)
{
    String output = string;
    for (int i = 1; i < times; ++i) {
        output = output + string;
    }
    return output;
}
```

The method seems to be building a String using concatenation in a loop. In each iteration, the String is converted to a StringBuffer/StringBuilder, appended to, and converted back to a String. **This can lead to a cost quadratic in the number of iterations, as the growing string is recopied in each iteration.**

Performance: SBSC_USE_STRINGBUFFER_CONCATENATION

Method concatenates strings using + in a loop

```
public static String repeat(String string, int times)
{
    int length = string.length() * times;
    StringBuffer output = new StringBuffer(length);
    for (int i = 0; i < times; ++i) {
        output.append(string);
    }
    return output.toString();
}
```

Correctness:

@Override

```
public Connection getConnection() throws SQLException {  
    QwicsConnection con = new QwicsConnection(host, port);  
    try {  
        con.open();  
    } catch (Exception e) {  
        new SQLException(e);  
    }  
    return con;  
}
```


Correctness: Missing “throw” before “new Exception”

@Override

```
public Connection getConnection() throws SQLException {  
    QwicsConnection con = new QwicsConnection(host, port);  
    try {  
        con.open();  
    } catch (Exception e) {  
        throw new SQLException(e);  
    }  
    return con;  
}
```

Challenges

- The analysis must produce zero false positives
 - Otherwise developers won't be able to build the code!
- The analysis needs to be really fast
 - Ideally < 100 ms
 - If it takes longer, developers will become irritated and lose productivity
- You can't just "turn on" a particular check
 - Every instance where that check fails will prevent existing code from building
 - There could be thousands of violations for a single check across large codebases

Challenges

- The analysis must produce zero false positives
 - Otherwise developers won't be able to build the code!
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 - Every instance where that check fails will prevent existing code from building
 - There could be thousands of violations for a single check across large codebases

(3) Use type annotations to detect common errors

- Uses a conservative analysis to prove the absence of certain defects
 - Null pointer errors, uninitialized fields, certain liveness issues, information leaks, SQL injections, bad regular expressions, incorrect physical units, bad format strings, ...
 - C.f. SpotBugs which makes no safety guarantees
 - Assuming that code is annotated and those annotations are correct
- Uses annotations to enhance type system
- Example: Java Checker Framework or MyPy



Annotations can be applied to types and declarations

// return value

```
@NonNull String toString() { ... }
```

// parameter

```
int compareTo(@NonNull String other) { ... }
```

// receiver ("this" parameter)

```
String toString(@Tainted MyClass this) { ... }
```

Detecting null pointer exceptions

- @Nullable indicates that an expression may be null
- @NonNull indicates that an expression must never be null
 - Rarely used because @NonNull is assumed by default
 - See documentation for other nullness annotations
- Guarantees that expressions annotated with @NonNull will never evaluate to null, forbids other expressions from being dereferenced

```
import org.checkerframework.checker.nullness.qual.*;
```

```
public class NullnessExampleWithWarnings {
```

```
    public void example() {
```

```
        @NonNull String foo = "foo";
```

```
        String bar = null;
```

```
        foo = bar;
```

```
    }
```

```
}
```

```
import org.checkerframework.checker.nullness.qual.*;
```

```
public class NullnessExampleWithWarnings {
```

```
    public void example() {
```

```
        @NonNull String foo = "foo";
```

```
        String bar = null;
```

```
        foo = bar;
```

```
    }
```

```
}
```

@Nullable is applied by default


```
import org.checkerframework.checker.nullness.qual.*;
```

```
public class NullnessExampleWithWarnings {
```

```
    public void example() {
```

```
        @NonNull String foo = "foo";
```

```
        String bar = null;
```

```
         foo = bar;
```

```
    }
```


```
}
```

@Nullable is applied by default

Error: [assignment.type.incompatible] incompatible types in assignment.
found : @Initialized @Nullable String
required: @UnknownInitialization @NonNull String

```
import org.checkerframework.checker.nullness.qual.*;
```

```
public class NullnessExampleWithWarnings {  
    public void example() {  
        @NonNull String foo = "foo";  
        String bar = null; // @Nullable  
  
        if (bar != null) {  
            foo = bar;  
        }  
    }  
}
```



**bar is refined to
@NonNull**

Is there a bug?

```
public String getDay(int dayIndex) {
    String day = null;
    switch (dayIndex) {
        case 0: day = "Monday";
        case 1: day = "Tuesday";
        case 2: day = "Wednesday";
        case 3: day = "Thursday";
    }
    return day;
}

public void example() {
    @NonNull String dayName = getDay(4);
    System.out.println("Today is " + dayName);
}
```

Is there a bug? Yes.

```
public String getDay(int dayIndex) {  
    String day = null;  
    switch (dayIndex) {  
        case 0: day = "Monday";  
        case 1: day = "Tuesday";  
        case 2: day = "Wednesday";  
        case 3: day = "Thursday";  
    }  
    return day;  
}
```

Error: [return.type.incompatible] incompatible types in return.
type of expression: @Initialized @Nullable String
method return type: @Initialized @NonNull String




```
public void example() {  
    @NonNull String dayName = getDay(4);  
    System.out.println("Today is " + dayName);  
}
```

Taint Analysis:

Prevents untrusted (tainted) data from reaching sensitive locations (sinks)

- Tracks flow of sensitive information through the program
- Tainted inputs come from arbitrary, possibly malicious sources
 - User inputs, unvalidated data
- Using tainted inputs may have dangerous consequences
 - Program crash, data corruption, leak private data, etc.
- We need to check that inputs are sanitized before reaching sensitive locations

Classic Example: SQL Injection



Classic Example: SQL Injection

```
void processRequest() {  
    String input = getUserInput();  
    String query = "SELECT ... " + input;  
    executeQuery(query);  
}
```

Classic Example: SQL Injection

```
void processRequest() {  
    String input = getUserInput();  
    String query = "SELECT ... " + input;  
    executeQuery(query);  
}
```

Tainted input arrives from an untrusted source

Tainted input flows to a sensitive sink

Classic Example: SQL Injection

```
void processRequest() {  
    String input = getUserInput();  
    input = sanitizeInput(input);  
    String query = "SELECT ... " + input;  
    executeQuery(query);  
}
```

Taint is removed by sanitizing the data

We can now safely execute query on untainted data

Taint Checker: @Tainted and @Untainted

```
void processRequest() {  
    @Tainted String input = getUserInput();  
    executeQuery(input);  
}
```

```
public void executeQuery(@Untainted String input) {  
    // ...  
}
```

```
@Untainted public String validate(String userInput) {  
    // ...  
}
```

Taint Checker: @Tainted and @Untainted

```
void processRequest() {  
    @Tainted String input = getUserInput();  
    executeQuery(input);  
}
```

Indicates that data is tainted

Argument *must* be untainted

```
public void executeQuery(@Untainted String input) {  
    // ...  
}
```

Guarantees that return value is untainted

```
@Untainted public String validate(String userInput) {  
    // ...  
}
```

Taint Checker: @Tainted and @Untainted

```
void processRequest() {  
    @Tainted String input = getUserInput();  
    executeQuery(input);  
}
```

Indicates that data is tainted

Argument *must* be untainted


```
public void executeQuery(@Untainted String input) {  
    // ...  
}
```

Guarantees that return value is untainted

```
@Untainted public String validate(String userInput) {  
    // ...  
}
```

Does this compile?

```
void processRequest() {  
    @Tainted String input = getUserInput();  
    input = validate(input);  
    executeQuery(input);  
}
```



Input becomes @Untainted

```
public void executeQuery(@Untainted String input) {  
    // ...  
}
```

```
@Untainted public String validate(String userInput) {  
    // ...  
}
```

Does this program compile?

```
void processRequest() {  
    @Tainted String input = getUserInput();  
    if (input.equals("little bobby drop tables")) {  
        input = validate(input);  
    }  
    executeQuery(input);  
}
```

Does this program compile? No.

```
void processRequest() {  
    @Tainted String input = getUserInput();  
    if (input.equals("little bobby drop tables")) {  
        input = validate(input); // @Untainted  
    }  
    executeQuery(input); // @Tainted  
}
```



Remember the Mars Climate Orbiter incident from 1999?

NASA's Mars Climate Orbiter (cost of \$327 million) was lost because of a discrepancy between use of metric unit Newtons and imperial measure Pound-force.

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When NASA Lost a Spacecraft Due to a Metric Math Mistake

WRITTEN BY **Ajay Harish** | UPDATED ON **March 10th, 2020** | APPROX READING TIME **11 Minutes**

Blog > CAE Hub > When NASA Lost a Spacecraft Due to a Metric Math Mistake

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In September of 1999, after almost 10 months of travel to Mars, the Mars Climate Orbiter burned and broke into pieces. On a day when NASA engineers were expecting to celebrate, the ground reality turned out to be completely different, all because someone failed to use the right units, i.e., the metric units! The Scientific American Space Lab made a brief but interesting video on this very topic.

NASA'S LOST SPACECRAFT

The Metric System and NASA's Mars Climate Orbiter

The Mars Climate Orbiter, built at a cost of \$125 million, was a 338-kilogram robotic space probe launched by NASA on December 11, 1998 to study the Martian climate, Martian atmosphere, and surface changes. In addition, its function was to act as the communications relay in the Mars Surveyor '98 program for the Mars Polar Lander. The navigation team at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) used the metric system of millimeters and meters in its calculations, while

Units Checker identifies physical unit inconsistencies

- Guarantees that operations are performed on the same kinds and units
- Kind annotations
 - @Acceleration, @Angle, @Area, @Current, @Length, @Luminance, @Mass, @Speed, @Substance, @Temperature, @Time
- SI unit annotation
 - @m, @km, @mm, @kg, @mPERs, @mPERs2, @radians, @degrees, @A, ...



```
import static org.checkerframework.checker.units.UnitsTools.m;  
import static org.checkerframework.checker.units.UnitsTools.mPERs;  
import static org.checkerframework.checker.units.UnitsTools.s;  
  
void demo() {  
    @m int x;  
    x = 5 * m;  
  
    @m int meters = 5 * m;  
    @s int seconds = 2 * s;  
  
    @mPERs int speed = meters / seconds;  
    @m int foo = meters + seconds;  
    @s int bar = seconds - meters;  
}
```

```
import static org.checkerframework.checker.units.UnitsTools.m;  
import static org.checkerframework.checker.units.UnitsTools.mPERs;  
import static org.checkerframework.checker.units.UnitsTools.s;
```

```
void demo() {
```

```
  @m int x;
```

```
  x = 5 * m;
```

@m indicates that x represents meters

```
  @m int meters = 5 * m;
```

```
  @s int seconds = 2 * s;
```

To assign a unit, multiply appropriate unit constant from `UnitTools`

```
  @mPERs int speed = meters / seconds;
```

```
  @m int foo = meters + seconds;
```

```
  @s int bar = seconds - meters;
```

```
}
```

Does this program compile?

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import static org.checkerframework.checker.units.UnitsTools.s;
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  @m int x;
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  x = 5 * m;
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
Addition and subtraction between meters and seconds is physically meaningless

Checker Framework: Limitations

- Can only analyze code that is annotated
 - Requires that dependent libraries are also annotated
 - Can be tricky, but not impossible, to retrofit annotations into existing codebases
- Only considers the signature and annotations of methods
 - Doesn't look at the implementation of methods that are being called
- Dynamically generated code
 - Spring Framework
- Can produce false positives!
 - Byproduct of necessary approximations

Infer: What if we didn't want annotations?

- Focused on memory safety bugs
 - Null pointer dereferences, memory leaks, resource leaks, ...
- Compositional interprocedural reasoning
 - Based on separation logic and bi-abduction
- Scalable and fast
 - Can run incremental analysis on changed code
- Does not require annotations
- Supports multiple languages
 - Java, C, C++, Objective-C
 - Programs are compiled to an intermediate representation



Examples

Infer's cost analysis statically estimates the execution cost of a program without running the code. For instance, assume that we had the following program:

```
void loop(ArrayList<Integer> list){
    for (int i = 0; i <= list.size(); i++){
    }
}
```

NULLPTR_DEREFERENCE

Reported as "Nullptr Dereference" by [pulse](#).

Infer reports null dereference bugs in Java, C, C++, and Objective-C when it is possible that the null pointer is dereferenced, leading to a crash.

Null dereference in Java

Many of Infer's reports of potential Null Pointer Exceptions (NPE) come from code of the form

```
p = foo(); // foo() might return null
stuff();
p.goo(); // dereferencing p, potential NPE
```


INVARIANT_CALL

Reported as "Invariant Call" by [loop-hoisting](#).

We report this issue type when a function call is loop-invariant and hoistable, i.e.

- the function has no side side effects (pure)
- has invariant arguments and result (i.e. have the same value in all loop iterations)
- it is guaranteed to execute, i.e. it dominates all loop sources

```
int foo(int x, int y) {
    return x + y;
}

void invariant_hoist(int size) {
    int x = 10;
    int y = 5;
    for (int i = 0; i < size; i++) {
        foo(x, y); // hoistable
    }
}
```

Beware of the inevitable false positives!

openssl / openssl

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Consider using Facebook's "infer" static analysis tool #6968 New Issue

Open richsalz opened this issue on Aug



dot-asm commented on Sep 2, 2018

Contributor



I'm not impressed. Majority, >2/3 of reports are DEAD_STORE and most common reason is last `*ptr++`. More specifically `++` is viewed problematic because *pointer* is not used anymore. The post-increment is also customarily part of macro, so that in order to address this, one would have to have two macros, one that leaves pointer post-incremented and one that doesn't. It would be excessive and doesn't help readability.

Majority of MEMORY_LEAK reports is because it fails to recognize for example `EVP_MD_CTX_free` as resource freeing. This is counter-productive, one has to work too hard look for real ones. There seem to be couple in `test/*...` Then there is some hairy stuff in `o_names.c:236`, maybe false positive... Oh! There seem to be real leak in `ssl3_final_finish_mac()`, multiple logical errors...

The best QA strategies employ a combination of tools

How Many of All Bugs Do We Find? A Study of Static Bug Detectors

Andrew Habib
andrew.a.habib@gmail.com
Department of Computer Science
TU Darmstadt
Germany

Michael Pradel
michael@binaervarianz.de
Department of Computer Science
TU Darmstadt
Germany

ABSTRACT

Static bug detectors are becoming increasingly popular and are widely used by professional software developers. While most work on bug detectors focuses on whether they find bugs at all, and on how many false positives they report in addition to legitimate warnings, the inverse question is often neglected: How many of all real-world bugs do static bug detectors find? This paper addresses this question by studying the results of applying three widely used static bug detectors to an extended version of the Defects4J dataset that consists of 15 Java projects with 594 known bugs. To decide which of these bugs the tools detect, we use a novel methodology that combines an automatic analysis of warnings and bugs with a manual validation of each candidate of a detected bug. The results of the study show that: (i) static bug detectors find a non-negligible amount of all bugs, (ii) different tools are mostly complementary to each other, and (iii) current bug detectors miss the large majority of the studied bugs. A detailed analysis of bugs missed by the static detectors shows that some bugs could have been found by variants of the existing detectors, while others are domain-specific problems that do not match any existing bug pattern. These findings help potential users of such tools to assess their utility, motivate and outline directions for future work on static bug detection, and provide a basis for future comparisons of static bug detection with other bug finding techniques, such as manual and automated testing.

International Conference on Automated Software Engineering (ASE '18), September 3–7, 2018, Montpellier, France. ACM, New York, NY, USA, 12 pages.
<https://doi.org/10.1145/3238147.3238213>

1 INTRODUCTION

Finding software bugs is an important but difficult task. For average industry code, the number of bugs per 1,000 lines of code has been estimated to range between 0.5 and 25 [21]. Even after years of deployment, software still contains unnoticed bugs. For example, studies of the Linux kernel show that the average bug remains in the kernel for a surprisingly long period of 1.5 to 1.8 years [8, 24]. Unfortunately, a single bug can cause serious harm, even if it has been subsisting for a long time without doing so, as evidenced by examples of software bugs that have caused huge economic losses and even killed people [17, 28, 46].

Given the importance of finding software bugs, developers rely on several approaches to reveal programming mistakes. One approach is to identify bugs during the development process, e.g., through pair programming or code review. Another direction is testing, ranging from purely manual testing over semi-automated testing, e.g., via manually written but automatically executed unit tests, to fully automated testing, e.g., with UI-level testing tools. Once the software is deployed, runtime monitoring can reveal so far missed bugs. e.g., collect information about abnormal runtime

Tool	Bugs
Error Prone	8
Infer	5
SpotBugs	18
<i>Total:</i>	31
<i>Total of 27 unique bugs</i>	




Figure 4: Total number of bugs found by all three static checkers and their overlap.

Summary

- Linters are cheap, fast, but imprecise analysis tools
 - Can be used for purposes other than bug detection (e.g., style)
- Conservative analyzers can demonstrate the absence of particular defects
 - At the cost of false positives due to necessary approximations
 - Inevitable trade-off between false positives and false negatives
- The best QA strategy involves multiple analysis and testing techniques
 - The exact set of tools and techniques depends on context